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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
HARRIS, District Judge: 
 
Defendant-appellant John Michael Iannone ("Iannone") 
appeals from the sentence imposed after his guilty plea to 
six counts of interstate transportation of property taken by 
fraud, one count of mail fraud, and one count of wire fraud. 
In determining Iannone's sentence pursuant to the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G."), the district court 
applied several enhancements to the offense level. Iannone 
challenges two actual and one de facto enhancements: (1) 
a two-level increase pursuant to S 3A1.1 for a vulnerable 
victim; (2) a two-level increase pursuant to S 3B1.3 for 
abuse of a position of private trust; and (3) an upward 
departure, achieved via a two-level increase, pursuant to 
S 5K2.0 for conduct outside the "heartland" of the fraud 
guideline. We affirm the sentence. 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
Essentially, Iannone defrauded people by encouraging 
them to invest in oil and gas drilling ventures, but then 
using the investors' money for his personal expenses rather 
than for the promised purposes. Iannone committed these 
frauds against several victims, living in different states, over 
the course of several years. The total of the funds Iannone 
fraudulently obtained amounted to more than $600,000. 
 
A. The Pennsylvania Frauds 
 
In 1991 or 1992, Iannone started his own company, 
Horizon Natural Resources ("HNR"), after leaving his job as 
an executive at Consolidated Natural Gas. HNR was an oil 
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exploration and natural gas tract leasing company, with an 
office in Wexford, Pennsylvania. At least initially, HNR was 
a legitimate business.1 Iannone was HNR's sole owner and 
operator, giving himself the title of Chief Executive Officer 
("CEO"). 
 
In early 1992, Iannone secured several leaseholds and 
two contractual farm-out arrangements with Exxon 
Corporation to drill and operate oil wells. Pursuant to the 
Exxon arrangement, Iannone contracted to drill a test well, 
Horizon No. 1, by a stated deadline. Despite two or three 
extensions of the deadline, Iannone never drilled the test 
well. By November 1992, Iannone's business appeared to be 
failing. He had not drilled any wells, all but one of his 
leaseholds had expired, and Exxon had terminated one of 
the two farm-out arrangements.2 
 
In December 1992, Iannone began to solicit investment 
monies from his neighbors, ostensibly for the purpose of 
drilling and operating two wells, Horizon Nos. 1 and 2. 
Unaware of the precarious state of Iannone's business, his 
neighbors invested approximately $320,000 with him. 
Included among those investors were several members of 
one family, the Stringerts. Iannone had been a friend and 
neighbor of the Stringerts for several years. Iannone sold 
the Stringerts what he labeled "interests" or"shares" in 
Horizon Nos. 1 and 2 and entered into contracts with the 
Stringerts on behalf of HNR. However, rather than investing 
the money in the drilling project, Iannone used it for his 
own personal expenses. 
 
Having spent all of that money by the end of October 
1993, Iannone began to solicit further investments in the 
Horizon drilling project. Iannone told his victims various 
lies in order to encourage their investment. For example, he 
told one investor that the wells already were drilled and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court made a factual finding, at defendant's request, that 
HNR began as a legitimate business venture. ("I think then that what we 
need to do is make a finding . . . that this was not a fraud in the whole 
cloth[,] meaning that the entire venture from its inception was not 
created for the purpose of committing a fraud. That, originally, there was 
some legitimate business function . . . ."). 
 
2. Exxon terminated the remaining farm-out arrangement in April 1993. 
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producing and told others that the wells were going to be 
drilled in December 1993 and that he had acquired Exxon's 
overriding royalty interest in the wells. As a result of these 
solicitations, Iannone received another $170,000 in 
investment monies from neighbors and acquaintances in 
October, November, and December 1993. As with the prior 
investments, Iannone used this money for personal 
expenses. 
 
From the time Iannone received the first investment 
monies in December 1992 until he absconded in January 
1994, Iannone continually lied to the Stringerts and the 
other investors in order to conceal his conversion of their 
money to his personal use. He told some investors that he 
had used their money to hire a drilling company and that 
he was in contact with Exxon about a process that would 
increase their yield from the wells. When one investor -- 
Howard Stringert -- became suspicious, Iannone agreed to 
buy back his $100,000 investment in the oil well project 
once he received a settlement from a pending suit against 
Consolidated Natural Gas. However, those representations 
were false. Iannone had not hired a drilling company, was 
not in contact with Exxon about a process to increase the 
wells' yield, and had already settled the litigation with 
Consolidated Natural Gas over a year-and-a-half earlier for 
only $17,000. Iannone did not use any of the investment 
monies for the drilling project; he took it all for his personal 
use. 
 
Throughout the period in which Iannone was soliciting 
his neighbors to invest in the Horizon project, he was 
falsely posing as a decorated Vietnam veteran. This adopted 
military hero persona helped Iannone gain the trust of the 
Stringert family. He provided some members of the 
Stringert family with a resume falsely indicating that he 
had spent three years in Vietnam as a Captain in the U.S. 
Army Special Forces and that he had been awarded several 
medals, including the Purple Heart and the Silver Star, and 
he represented that he had received a recommendation for 
the Congressional Medal of Honor. He provided the 
Stringerts with a false citation recounting the heroic acts 
for which he supposedly received the Silver Star. Howard 
Stringert described the story recounted in the citation as 
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"Ramboesque."3 One member of the family, Janice 
Stringert-Streich, visited Iannone's home where he had a 
Silver Star medal prominently displayed. Janice and her 
brother Howard Stringert both testified at the sentencing 
hearing that their family had great respect for military 
veterans and that this influenced their decisions to invest 
with Iannone. 
 
By October 1993, some investors had become suspicious 
of Iannone, and he prepared for his disappearance, buying 
a truck under a false name with some of the investment 
money. On January 11, 1994, Iannone disappeared, leaving 
his wife and three children behind. Approximately $70,000 
to $110,000 in investment funds were unaccounted for at 
the time of his abscondance. In order to avoid being 
pursued, Iannone faked his own death. He left behind a 
letter claiming that he had left on a secret mission for a 
government "alphabet agency" and that he feared it might 
result in his death. He then left his van, splattered with 
blood and littered with shell casings from a weapon, parked 
at the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport. Local police 
quickly realized both that the scene had been fabricated 
and that Iannone had not been the victim of a crime. 
 
B. The Colorado Frauds 
 
After his disappearance from Pennsylvania, Iannone 
settled in Colorado where he adopted the alias Wayne D. 
Hamilton, the name of a deceased Vietnam veteran. He 
continued to masquerade as a Vietnam war hero and told 
acquaintances that his family had been killed by a drunk 
driver. Posing as a Vietnam veteran, he befriended several 
people, including Clancy O'Dowd and Diana Hegler, 
through an America Online chat room for veterans. He 
developed a close friendship with O'Dowd, based on their 
supposed shared combat experiences in Vietnam. 
 
Apparently, Iannone lived off the Pennsylvania fraud 
proceeds for about three years. When he ran low on money, 
Iannone essentially repeated his Pennsylvania scheme. As 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The citation recounts a bold, dramatic tale in which Iannone, as the 
commanding officer of a Special Forces A-Team, rescued four American 
prisoners of war held captive deep within enemy territory. 
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head of W. D. H. Associates, a sham oil and gas company, 
Iannone offered his new friends and neighbors the 
opportunity to invest in oil and/or gas wells in Texas and 
Nebraska. Several of his friends and neighbors acquiesced, 
buying percentage shares of oil and/or gas well leases from 
Iannone. As with the Pennsylvania frauds, Iannone did not 
invest this money for the purpose that it was entrusted to 
him, but used it for personal expenses. He received 
approximately $115,500 from the Colorado frauds. 
 
Again, Iannone lied to the investors in order to conceal 
his fraud. Iannone told investors that the wells were 
producing and that they should expect their first royalty 
checks to arrive in March or April of 1997. When the 
checks did not materialize, Iannone again disappeared. On 
or around June 3, 1997, Iannone left Colorado, falsely 
informing most investors that he was going to Texas to 
check on the wells. He told one investor, O'Dowd, a 
different lie: that he was going to confront the drunk driver 
who had killed his family. When some of the investors 
began to communicate with each other and became 
suspicious, Iannone sent them an electronic message 
claiming to be an employee of an "alphabet agency" in the 
witness protection program. Iannone was arrested by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation in July 1997. 
 
C. The District Court's Sentence 
 
Iannone pled guilty to six counts of interstate 
transportation of property taken by fraud, one count of mail 
fraud, and one count of wire fraud. The district court 
conducted a two-day sentencing hearing at which four of 
Iannone's victims testified: O'Dowd, Hegler, Janice 
Stringert-Streich, and Howard Stringert. The court found 
several Guidelines enhancements to be applicable. Based 
on O'Dowd's testimony, the court determined that he was a 
vulnerable victim and increased Iannone's offense level by 
two points pursuant to S 3A1.1 of the Guidelines. The court 
also determined that Iannone occupied a position of private 
trust vis-a-vis his victims and abused this trust, and 
therefore increased the offense level by two points pursuant 
to S 3B1.3 of the Guidelines. The court increased Iannone's 
offense level by an additional two points consistent with 
S 5K2.0 of the Guidelines, finding that, based on a 
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combination of factors, Iannone's conduct was sufficiently 
outside the "heartland" of the fraud guideline to warrant an 
upward departure. Based on a total guidelines offense level 
of 21 and a criminal history category of I, which provided 
a range of imprisonment of 37 to 46 months, the court 
sentenced Iannone to 46 months of imprisonment. See 
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, 
Ch. 5, Pt. A (Nov. 1997).4 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
Iannone argues that the increases in his offense level 
were improper and that he should have been sentenced 
based on a offense level of 15, which established a range of 
18 to 24 months of imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt. A 
(Nov. 1997). 
 
A. Vulnerable Victim Adjustment 
 
Iannone challenges the district court's decision to apply 
a two-level "vulnerable victim" offense level adjustment 
pursuant to S 3A1.1(b), claiming that the victim on which 
the court based its decision -- O'Dowd -- was not a 
vulnerable victim within the meaning of the provision. He 
also argues that, even if O'Dowd was a vulnerable victim, 
there was no demonstrated nexus between his vulnerability 
and the fraud. A district court's factual findings concerning 
the vulnerable victim adjustment are reversible only for 
clear error. See United States v. Monostra, 125 F.3d 183, 
188 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Hillstrom, 988 
F.2d 448, 450 (3d Cir. 1993)). Because we find the district 
court did not clearly err in determining that O'Dowd was a 
vulnerable victim and that Iannone exploited this 
vulnerability to aid in his commission of the fraud, we 
affirm the district court's two-level enhancement under 
S 3A1.1(b). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We apply the November 1997 edition of the Guidelines Manual, as 
that was the version in effect on the date of Iannone's sentencing -- 
June 19, 1998. See U.S.S.G. S 1B1.11(a) (Nov. 1997) ("The court shall 
use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is 
sentenced."); 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a)(4). 
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Section 3A1.1(b) provides that: 
 
       If the defendant knew or should have known that a 
       victim of the offense was unusually vulnerable due to 
       age, physical or mental condition, or that a victim was 
       otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal 
       conduct, increase by 2 levels. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 3A1.1(b) (Nov. 1997).5  Application Note 2 to 
subsection (b) provides a useful example of when this 
enhancement is appropriately applied: 
 
       The adjustment would apply, for example, in a fraud 
       case where the defendant marketed an ineffective 
       cancer cure or in a robbery where the defendant 
       selected a handicapped victim. But it would not apply 
       in a case where the defendant sold fraudulent 
       securities by mail to the general public and one of the 
       victims happened to be senile. Similarly, for example, a 
       bank teller is not an unusually vulnerable victim solely 
       by virtue of the teller's position in a bank. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 3A1.1, comment. (n.2) (Nov. 1997). Thus, the 
note suggests that this enhancement is designed to apply 
where a defendant knowingly or recklessly exploits a 
victim's vulnerability in order to facilitate his commission of 
the crime. 
 
In accordance with S 3A1.1 and its corresponding 
application note, this Court applies a three-step analysis to 
a decision to apply the vulnerable victim enhancement. The 
enhancement may be applied where: (1) the victim was 
particularly susceptible or vulnerable to the criminal 
conduct; (2) the defendant knew or should have known of 
this susceptibility or vulnerability; and (3) this vulnerability 
or susceptibility facilitated the defendant's crime in some 
manner; that is, there was "a nexus between the victim's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. While it does not affect our analysis, we note that S 3A1.1(b) recently 
has been amended. The new provision states that"[i]f the defendant 
knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable 
victim, increase by 2 levels." U.S.S.G. S 3A1.1(b)(1) (Nov. 1998). The 
amended provision also adds a subsection increasing the offense level by 
an additional two levels if the offense "involved a large number of 
vulnerable victims." U.S.S.G. S 3A1.1(b)(2) (Nov. 1998). 
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vulnerability and the crime's ultimate success." Monostra, 
125 F.3d at 190 (quoting United States v. Lee , 973 F.2d 
832, 834 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 
1. O'Dowd Was Particularly Vulnerable to Iannone's 
       Criminal Conduct 
 
Iannone argues that the district court improperly found 
O'Dowd was a vulnerable victim based merely on his status 
as a Vietnam veteran. This argument is without merit, as it 
is abundantly clear from the record that the court did not 
base its finding of O'Dowd's vulnerability merely on broad, 
unsupported generalizations relating to his veteran status. 
O'Dowd testified at length at the sentencing hearing, and, 
based on his testimony, the court made express, specific 
findings as to his particular susceptibility as well as 
Iannone's knowledge of this susceptibility. In rendering its 
sentencing decision as to the S 3A1.1 enhancement, the 
court noted: 
 
       [The question is whether] O'Dowd [was] particularly 
       vulnerable in some way different from the general 
       public, and I have no problem in saying[ ] yes. Just 
       because he's a big strong man and a veteran of combat 
       doesn't mean that he [was not] vulnerable in a very, 
       very tragic way[,] and that is just as he described it so 
       beautifully in his testimony. He developed a belief that 
       people who share combat are brothers-in-arms and can 
       be believed. He made that [belief] known to the 
       defendant. So, [I find that] he was vulnerable in that he 
       was more susceptible to be deluded [and] cheated by 
       someone who represented himself to be a brother-in- 
       arms. . . . O'Dowd was vulnerable in the way he 
       described he was vulnerable, and it was a particular 
       vulnerability because it wouldn't apply to the general 
       public but only to someone who expressed himself as 
       he did. 
 
Thus, contrary to Iannone's assertions, the district court 
did not find that Vietnam veterans are per se vulnerable to 
persons claiming to be fellow veterans and then rely solely 
on O'Dowd's veteran status to find that he was a vulnerable 
victim. Rather, the court based its determination that 
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O'Dowd was a vulnerable victim on his individual 
personality traits and characteristics, as testified to by 
O'Dowd at the sentencing hearing. Only after this specific 
inquiry did the court find that O'Dowd was particularly 
vulnerable to one representing himself as a fellow combat 
veteran. Thus, the district court did not clearly err in 
determining that O'Dowd was "particularly susceptible" to 
Iannone's fraud. 
 
2. Iannone Knew or Should Have Known of O'Dowd's 
       Vulnerability 
 
The district court specifically found that Iannone knew or 
had reason to know of O'Dowd's vulnerability to fellow 
Vietnam veterans. ("I find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant knew or had reason to know 
that . . . O'Dowd[ ] [was] vulnerable to a predation by 
somebody who purported to be a colleague at war[ ] [and] a 
brother-at-arms."). The record provides ample evidence to 
support this finding. O'Dowd's testimony, supported by 
correspondence between O'Dowd and Iannone introduced 
into evidence at the sentencing hearing, demonstrates that 
Iannone actively encouraged and developed a friendship 
with O'Dowd, based in large part on their supposed shared 
combat experiences in Vietnam. The friendship between the 
two men began through an America Online chat room for 
military veterans and progressed to telephone calls, 
electronic messages, and meeting in person on 
approximately three occasions. During the course of their 
friendship, Iannone and O'Dowd discussed their feelings 
about honor, duty, and the bonds between fellow combat 
veterans on several occasions. In many of their 
communications, Iannone and O'Dowd used the phrase 
"back to back," which, according to O'Dowd's testimony, is 
a phrase derived from his Vietnam experience that 
essentially means "I would put my life in your hands and 
trust you to use it properly." Similarly, O'Dowd and 
Iannone often referred to one another as "brother" in their 
correspondence. O'Dowd testified that Iannone was aware 
of his feelings of trust and loyalty towards fellow combat 
veterans generally and towards Iannone in particular. Thus, 
the record provides sufficient evidence that Iannone was 
aware of O'Dowd's vulnerability. 
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3. O'Dowd's Vulnerability Facilitated Iannone's Crime 
 
The district court also found that O'Dowd's vulnerability 
facilitated Iannone's fraud, noting the link between 
 839<!>O'Dowd's vulnerability, Iannone's awareness of that 
 
vulnerability, and Iannone's fraud. ("It [is] clear that 
[O'Dowd's] vulnerability was made known to the defendant. 
That's why it was so easy for the defendant to extract these 
funds from [O'Dowd] . . . without much in the way of proof 
of what he was going to get for it."). Iannone disputes this 
finding, arguing that, even if O'Dowd was a vulnerable 
victim, there was no demonstrated nexus between this 
vulnerability and Iannone's crime. However, the record 
supports the court's finding. According to O'Dowd's 
testimony, Iannone framed his investment offer as a plea 
for help. Iannone initially asked O'Dowd for a loan, claiming 
that an investor had backed out of one of his investments 
and that he was going to lose the entire investment. Only 
later did Iannone suggest that O'Dowd invest in the project 
himself, rather than lend him money. O'Dowd testified that 
he invested primarily because he was concerned that his 
"brother" was in trouble and he would do anything he could 
to assist him. He also testified that he made this known to 
Iannone. Thus, based on the evidence before it, the district 
court did not err -- much less "clearly"-- in determining 
that O'Dowd's vulnerability facilitated Iannone's fraud. 
 
In sum, we find that the district court did not clearly err 
in finding: (1) that O'Dowd was particularly vulnerable to 
Iannone's fraud; (2) that Iannone was, or should have been, 
aware of his vulnerability; and (3) that O'Dowd's 
vulnerability facilitated Iannone's crime. We therefore affirm 
the decision to enhance the offense level underS 3A1.1(b). 
 
B. Abuse of a Position of Trust Enhancement  
 
Iannone claims that the district court erred in applying a 
two-level enhancement to his offense level pursuant to 
S 3B1.3 of the Guidelines for his abuse of a position of 
private trust. Section 3B1.3 provides in part that:"If the 
defendant abused a position of public or private trust . . . 
in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or 
concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels." U.S.S.G. 
S 3B1.3 (Nov. 1997). In applying S 3B1.3, a court must 
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initially determine whether the defendant occupied a 
position of public or private trust. If he did occupy such a 
position, then the court must determine whether the 
defendant abused this position of trust in a way that 
significantly facilitated his crime. See United States v. 
Craddock, 993 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir. 1993). Because 
Iannone challenges only the initial determination of 
whether he held a position of trust, we devote most of our 
discussion to this issue. We review de novo a district 
court's determination that a defendant occupied a position 
of trust within the meaning of S 3B1.3, as this is a legal 
question. See United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 412 
(3d Cir. 1996) (citing Craddock, 993 F.2d at 340). We review 
a district court's finding that a defendant abused a position 
of trust for clear error, as this is a factual question. Id. 
 
Iannone argues that he did not occupy a position of trust 
with respect to his victims, and therefore the district court 
should not have enhanced his offense level pursuant to 
S 3B1.3. Determining what constitutes a position of trust 
for the purposes of S 3B1.3 is not a simple task. Neither 
S 3B1.3 nor its applicable Commentary clearly defines what 
is meant by a "position of trust." United States v. Smaw, 
993 F.2d 902, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1993). "Position of trust" could 
be defined narrowly to encompass only formal fiduciary or 
employment relationships. Or, the concept could be defined 
broadly to include any relationship in which a victim places 
his trust in the defendant. The Commentary to S 3B1.3 
indicates that the Sentencing Commission ("Commission") 
did not intend for the term "position of trust" to be 
interpreted too narrowly, as the Commentary does not limit 
the phrase's application only to formal fiduciary or 
employment relationships. See U.S.S.G. S 3B1.3, comment. 
(n.1) (Nov. 1997). However, a court should hesitate before 
defining the concept too broadly, as "there is a component 
of misplaced trust inherent in the concept of fraud." United 
States v. Garrison, 133 F.3d 831, 838 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(quoting United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560, 1567 (11th 
Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
United States v. Trammell, 133 F.3d 1343, 1355 (10th Cir. 
1998) ("The [S 3B1.3] guideline enhancement requires more 
than a mere showing that the victim had confidence in 
defendant.") (citing United States v. Brunson, 54 F.3d 673, 
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678 (10th Cir. 1995)); United States v. Koehn, 74 F.3d 199, 
201 (10th Cir. 1996) ("In every successful fraud the 
defendant will have created confidence and trust in the 
victim, but the sentencing enhancement is not intended to 
apply in every case of fraud."). 
 
Application Note 1 of the Commentary to S 3B1.3 
provides some guidance as to what is considered a position 
of public or private trust for the purposes of this guideline 
provision. It states in part: 
 
       "Public or private trust" refers to a position of public or 
       private trust characterized by professional or 
       managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary 
       judgment that is ordinarily given considerable 
       deference). Persons holding such positions ordinarily 
       are subject to significantly less supervision than 
       employees whose responsibilities are primarily non- 
       discretionary in nature. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 3B1.3, comment. (n.1) (Nov. 1997). The 
application note also provides specific examples explaining 
when S 3B1.3 should or should not be applied: 
 
       This adjustment, for example, would apply in the case 
       of an embezzlement of a client's funds by an attorney 
       serving as a guardian, a bank executive's fraudulent 
       loan scheme, or the criminal sexual abuse of a patient 
       by a physician under the guise of an examination. This 
       adjustment would not apply in the case of an 
       embezzlement or theft by an ordinary bank teller or 
       hotel clerk . . . . 
 
Id. 
 
In accordance with the Commission's guidance, this 
Court has developed a "position of trust" analysis that 
"look[s] to the essence of the meaning of a position of 
trust." United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1191 (3d Cir. 
1994); see also United States v. Boyle, 10 F.3d 485, 489 
(7th Cir. 1993) (stating that, in determining whether a 
defendant occupies a "position of trust," a court "must look 
beyond descriptive labels to the actual nature of the 
relationship and the responsibility the defendant is given"). 
We consider three factors in determining whether a 
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defendant occupies a position of trust for the purposes of 
S 3B1.3: "(1) whether the position allows the defendant to 
commit a difficult-to-detect wrong; (2) the degree of 
authority which the position vests in the defendant vis-a-vis 
the object of the wrongful act; and (3) whether there has 
been reliance on the integrity of the person occupying the 
position." Pardo, 25 F.3d at 1192. These matters "should be 
considered in light of the guiding rationale of[S 3B1.3]--to 
punish `insiders' who abuse their positions rather than 
those who take advantage of an available opportunity." Id. 
This Court has expressly refused to "draw a bright line 
limiting the abuse of trust increase to the employment 
relationship." Id. at 1190-1191. A defendant may occupy a 
position of trust outside the traditional employment 
context. Id. 
 
Based on our consideration of S 3B1.3 and the case law 
interpreting the provision, we agree with the district court's 
conclusion that Iannone occupied a position of private trust 
vis-a-vis his Pennsylvania victims.6 The facts of this case 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Because we find that Iannone occupied a position of trust vis-a-vis his 
Pennsylvania victims, it is not necessary to decide whether he also 
occupied a position of trust vis-a-vis his Colorado victims. Iannone's 
conduct with respect to the Pennsylvania frauds, by itself, justifies 
application of the S 3B1.3 enhancement. The record does not provide as 
much information about Iannone's Colorado frauds. Apparently, his 
Colorado frauds were committed in a very similar fashion as his 
Pennsylania frauds, with one significant difference. In connection with 
the Colorado frauds, Iannone solicited investments in drilling projects in 
his capacity as head of W.D.H. Associates ("WDH"), a sham oil and gas 
company. Unlike HNR, which was a legitimate company at one time, 
WDH was apparently a sham company from the start. Thus, Iannone 
never occupied any legitimate position of trust with respect to his 
Colorado victims. 
 
Although the issue is not of dispositive significance, we note that the 
majority of circuits that have addressed it have held that a defendant 
occupying a sham position of trust is subject to theS 3B1.3 
enhancement. See United States v. Deal, 147 F.3d 562, 563 (7th Cir. 
1998); United States v. Barnes, 125 F.3d 1287, 1292 (9th Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Gill, 99 F.3d 484, 488-89 (1st Cir. 1996); United States 
v. Queen, 4 F.3d 925, 929 (10th Cir. 1993). But see United States v. 
Echevarria, 33 F.3d 175, 181 (2d Cir. 1994). According to the majority 
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show that all three Pardo factors have been met: Iannone's 
position as head of the company in which the victims 
invested made his fraud difficult to detect, vested him with 
significant authority over the victim's investment monies, 
and encouraged his victims to rely on his perceived 
integrity. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
view, where a defendant provided his victims with sufficient, objective 
indicia that he occupied a position of trust, it is appropriate to hold 
him 
accountable under S 3B1.3. From the perspective of the victim, the 
threat posed is the same whether the defendant occupies a legitimate or 
sham position of trust: the position facilitates the crime and reduces the 
chance of detection. See Gill, 99 F.3d at 489. 
 
We also note that the Commentary to S 3B1.3 recently has been 
amended to clarify that defendants holding sham positions of trust are 
within the purview of the enhancement: 
 
       This adjustment also applies in a case in which the defendant 
       provides sufficient indicia to the victim that the defendant 
       legitimately holds a position of private or public trust when, in 
fact, 
       the defendant does not. For example, the adjustment applies in the 
       case of a defendant who (A) perpetrates a financial fraud by 
leading 
       an investor to believe the defendant is a legitimate investment 
       broker; or (B) perpetrates a fraud by representing falsely to a 
patient 
       or employer that the defendant is a licensed physician. In making 
       the misrepresentation, the defendant assumes a position of trust, 
       relative to the victim, that provides the defendant with the same 
       opportunity to commit a difficult-to-detect crime that the 
defendant 
       would have had if the position were held legitimately. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 3B1.3, comment. (n.2) (Nov. 1998). With limited exception, 
Guidelines commentary is binding on courts. See Stinson v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) ("[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual 
that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it 
violates 
the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a 
plainly 
erroneous reading of, that guideline."); see also U.S.S.G. S 1B1.7 (Nov. 
1997) ("Failure to follow . . . commentary could constitute an incorrect 
application of the guidelines . . . .") (citing 18 U.S.C. S 3742). An 
amendment to Guidelines commentary that merely "clarifies" the 
meaning of a guideline is given great weight, unless its application would 
be unconstitutional. See United States v. Menon, 24 F.3d 550, 567 (3d 
Cir. 1994); cf. U.S.S.G. S 1B1.11(b)(2) ("[I]f a court applies an earlier 
edition of the Guidelines Manual, the court shall consider subsequent 
amendments, to the extent that such amendments are clarifying rather 
than substantive changes."). 
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First, Iannone's position allowed him to commit a 
difficult-to-detect wrong. Iannone primarily argues that his 
fraud was easily detectable, but was not discovered due to 
his victims' lack of diligence. Iannone's argument evinces a 
misunderstanding of the first Pardo consideration. That 
prong of the Pardo analysis is not a due diligence 
requirement. Iannone's victims did not have to be experts 
in the oil and gas industry or conduct an extensive 
investigation into Iannone's business for the S 3B1.3 
enhancement to be applicable. In fact, one rationale for a 
S 3B1.3 enhancement is that, where the defendant occupies 
a position of trust, his victims are less likely to discover his 
fraud because they will not investigate the matter as 
thoroughly as they would in an arm's-length transaction. 
The focus of the first Pardo prong is on the defendant, not 
his victims, and requires the court to determine whether 
the position the defendant occupied allowed him to commit 
a difficult-to-detect crime. 
 
In connection with his Pennsylvania frauds, Iannone 
solicited investors in his capacity as the owner and CEO of 
HNR, an oil and gas drilling/leasing company. Iannone 
solicited investment monies for the express purpose of 
financing an exploratory drilling venture, selling the victims 
"interests" or "shares" of HNR's Horizon projects and 
signing contracts with the victims on behalf of the 
company. Thus, Iannone occupied a "managerial" position, 
in which he expectedly was entrusted with the task of using 
the investors' money to complete a drilling project. By 
contrast, his victims were merely passive investors with 
little, if any, knowledge of the oil and gas industry. These 
facts indicate that Iannone's relationship with his 
Pennsylvania victims was analogous to the fiduciary 
relationship that exists between a corporate officer or 
director and the corporation's shareholders. 
 
This fiduciary-like relationship allowed Iannone to 
commit a difficult-to-detect wrong. His managerial position 
allowed him to conceal his personal use of the victims' 
investment money. In order to prevent his fraud from being 
detected, he provided the victims with false reports on the 
progress of the drilling project and his use of their 
investment money. Because Iannone was the sole owner 
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and operator of HNR, he was the victims' only source of 
information about the status of their investment and was 
not subject to any supervision that would have uncovered 
his fraud. 
 
Iannone's position also satisfies the second Pardo 
criterion, as it provided him unfettered authority over the 
victims' investment money. As sole owner and operator of 
HNR, he alone was entrusted with the proper use of the 
investment money to complete the drilling project. This 
total lack of supervision allowed Iannone to spend the 
investment money freely. Once his victims invested in HNR, 
no one but Iannone had access to, or supervisory power 
over, HNR's financial records and bank accounts. 
 
Finally, the evidence demonstrates the victims' reliance 
on Iannone's perceived integrity as owner and CEO of HNR. 
Iannone gave some of his victims his resume listing years 
of experience in the oil and gas industry and providing 
detailed descriptions of that experience. Iannone further 
fostered reliance on his integrity by posing as a decorated 
Vietnam veteran. Some of his victims indicated that they 
decided to invest with Iannone because he was both a 
veteran and an experienced businessperson offering what 
seemed to be a great investment opportunity. Based on 
Iannone's representations, his victims believed they were 
investing in a genuine drilling project. 
 
Thus, application of the three Pardo considerations to 
Iannone's case demonstrates that, as CEO of HNR, he 
occupied a position of private trust vis-a-vis his 
Pennsylvania victims.7 The foregoing analysis accords with 
our decisions in recent cases involving similar factual 
situations. See United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 195- 
96 (3d Cir. 1998); Sokolow, 91 F.3d at 412-13. Having 
found that Iannone occupied a position of private trust, we 
also conclude (and appellant does not challenge) that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Iannone also argues that the S 3B1.3 enhancement is inapplicable 
because his friendship with the victims did not constitute a position of 
trust. This argument ignores a critical fact of this case: Iannone 
solicited 
investments from his friends and neighbors in his capacity as head of a 
company. The position of trust at issue is not Iannone's friendship with 
the victims, but his position as owner and CEO of HNR. 
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district court did not clearly err in finding Iannone abused 
his position of trust in a manner that significantly 
facilitated his crime. Therefore, we affirm the district court's 
decision to enhance Iannone's offense level pursuant to 
S 3B1.3. 
 
C. Section 5K2.0 Departure 
 
Finally, Iannone challenges the district court's decision to 
impose an upward departure (set at two levels) pursuant to 
S 5K2.0, based on a combination of factors that took the 
case out of the "heartland" of the fraud guideline. A district 
court's decision to depart from the applicable guideline 
range is subject to review for abuse of discretion. See Koon 
v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 99-100 (1996); United States 
v. Jacobs, 167 F.3d 792, 798 (3d Cir. 1999). Wefind the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by departing from 
the Guidelines in this case. 
 
The Commission conceives of each offense guideline as 
"carving out a `heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying 
the conduct that each guideline describes." U.S.S.G., Ch.1, 
Pt. A, intro. p.s. 4(b) (Nov. 1997). In the unusual case in 
which a defendant's conduct falls outside the typical 
"heartland," the court may consider a departure from the 
Guidelines sentence. See id.; United States v. Baird, 109 
F.3d 856, 870 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 243 (1997) 
(citing Koon, 518 U.S. at 93-94). Section 5K2.0 provides 
that a court may impose a sentence outside the applicable 
guideline range "if the court finds `that there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a 
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the 
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that 
should result in a sentence different from that described.' " 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0, p.s. (Nov. 1997) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
S 3553(b)). The Commentary to S 5K2.0 adds that a court 
may also depart in the "extraordinary case that, because of 
a combination of such characteristics or circumstances, 
differs significantly from the `heartland' cases covered by 
the guidelines in a way that is important to the statutory 
purposes of sentencing, even though none of the 
characteristics or circumstances individually distinguishes 
the case," but also notes that these departures "will be 
extremely rare." Id., comment.; see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 
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113-114 (noting that departure is possible based on a 
combination of factors, even though none of the factors 
standing alone would justify a departure). Outside of a 
limited number of prohibited factors that a court may never 
consider as grounds for departure, the Guidelines do not 
"limit the kinds of factors . . . that could constitute grounds 
for departure in an unusual case."8  U.S.S.G., Ch.1, Pt. A, 
intro. p.s. 4(b) (Nov. 1997); see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 106; 
Baird, 109 F.3d at 870. 
 
The Supreme Court provided additional guidance on 
departures in Koon, instructing courts to apply the 
following analysis when considering a S 5K2.0 departure. 
First, identify the factor or factors that potentially take the 
case outside the Guidelines' "heartland" and make it special 
or unusual. Koon, 518 U.S. at 95. Second, determine 
whether the Guidelines forbid departures based on the 
factor, encourage departures based on the factor, or do not 
mention the factor at all.9 Id. at 94-95. Third, apply the 
appropriate rule: (1) if the factor is forbidden, the court 
cannot use it as a basis for departure; (2) if the factor is 
encouraged, the court is authorized to depart if the 
applicable guideline does not already take it into account; 
(3) if the factor is discouraged, or encouraged but already 
taken into account by the applicable guideline, the court 
should depart only if the factor is present to an exceptional 
degree, or in some other way makes the case different from 
the ordinary case in which the factor is present; or (4) if the 
factor is unmentioned, "the court must, after considering 
the structure and theory of both relevant individual 
guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole, decide 
whether [the factor] is sufficient to take the case out of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The prohibited factors that a court may never consider are listed in 
SS 5H1.10 (race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, socio-economic 
status), 5H1.12 (lack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances), 
part of 5H1.4 (drug or alcohol dependence or abuse), and part of 5K2.12 
(personal financial difficulties and economic pressures upon a trade or 
business). See U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro. p.s. 4(b) (Nov. 1997). 
 
9. For example, the Guidelines discourage departure based on the 
defendant's educational and vocational skills, see U.S.S.G. S 5H1.2 (Nov. 
1997), and encourage departure based on victim provocation. See 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.10 (Nov. 1997). 
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Guideline's heartland." Id. at 95-96 (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. 
Abuhouran, 161 F.3d 206, 210-211 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 119 S.Ct. 1479 (1999) (restating the third step of 
the Koon analysis). Koon adds that departures based on 
unmentioned factors will be "highly infrequent." 518 U.S. at 
96 (quoting U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A (Nov. 1995)); see also 
United States v. Haut, 107 F.3d 213, 218 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 117 S.Ct. 2528, and cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 130 
(1997). 
 
Before reviewing the district court's application of the 
Koon analysis, we note the substantial deference that we 
owe the decision to depart from the Guidelines. See Koon, 
518 U.S. at 98; United States v. Sally, 116 F.3d 76, 81 (3d 
Cir. 1997). While we must also bear in mind that both the 
Guidelines and Koon indicate that S 5K2.0 departures will 
be highly infrequent, it was within the district court's 
discretion to determine whether the facts of this case 
involved aggravating circumstances of such an exceptional 
degree that they took the case out of the "heartland" of 
ordinary fraud cases. See S 5K2.0, comment. (Nov. 1997); 
Koon, 518 U.S. at 96-98. Koon emphasizes the institutional 
advantage that district courts have over appellate courts in 
determining whether the facts of a given case take it out of 
the "heartland" of Guidelines cases, noting that "[w]hether 
a given factor is present to a degree not adequately 
considered by the Commission . . . [is a] matter[ ] 
determined in large part by comparison with the facts of 
other Guidelines cases" and that the district courts "see 
many more Guidelines cases than appellate courts do." Id. 
at 98; cf. Sally, 116 F.3d at 81 (stating that departure 
determinations should be left to sentencing courts to make 
"on a case-by-case basis, relying on the particular facts and 
circumstances of each case."). 
 
The district court found that several aggravating factors 
relating to Iannone's criminal conduct, taken collectively, 
constituted sufficient grounds for an upward departure 
(which, as noted, the court permissibly achieved by the 
device of a two-level offense level increase) underS 5K2.0. 
The court identified the following factors: (1) Iannone's 
masquerade as a decorated Vietnam combat veteran, a 
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person in the witness protection program, and a 
government agent on a secret mission; (2) Iannone's 
misrepresentation that he had received several combat 
medals as well as a recommendation for the Congressional 
Medal of Honor; (3) Iannone's attempt to conceal his fraud 
by faking his own death; (4) Iannone's fabricated story 
about his family's having been killed by a drunk driver; and 
(5) the severe psychological harm Iannone's fraud caused 
his victims. Finding that these factors were not adequately 
considered by the Guidelines and that they "take[ ] this 
case outside of the heartland of the [fraud] guideline[ ]," the 
court departed upwards by two levels. The court noted that 
it found none of these factors justified departure by itself; 
but, in combination, the factors made the case very 
unusual. 
 
The Guidelines neither forbid nor discourage departures 
based on the factors enumerated by the district court.10 Nor 
are the factors encouraged bases for departure under the 
Guidelines.11 Thus, the factors should be classified as 
"unmentioned" by the Guidelines.12  As unmentioned 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The forbidden bases for departure are listed supra in note 8. The 
discouraged bases for departure are a defendant's: (1) age; (2) education 
and vocational skills; (3) mental and emotional conditions; (4) physical 
condition or appearance; (5) employment record; (6) family ties and 
responsibilities, and community ties; (7) military, civic, charitable, or 
public service, employment-related contributions, and similar prior good 
works; and (8) subjection to coercion or duress. See SS 5H1.1-5H1.6, 
5H1.11, and 5K2.12. 
 
11. Encouraged bases for departure are listed in Chapter Five, Part K of 
the Guidelines Manual. See, e.g., S 5K2.2 (significant physical injury). 
 
12. One of the factors the district court relied upon as a basis for its 
S 5K2.0 "combination" departure was the psychological harm Iannone's 
fraud caused his victims. Notably, "extreme psychological injury" is an 
encouraged basis for departure under S 5K2.3. However, based on the 
district court's factual findings, we classify this factor as 
"unmentioned" 
by the Guidelines, rather than as an encouraged basis for departure. 
While the court found that Iannone's victims suffered more psychological 
harm than a typical fraud victim ("I would [not] equate the kind of harm 
that was caused here with the typical kind of harm. . . . [T]he emotional 
and psychiatric trauma that is attendant not only to losing your money 
but [also] . . . what you thought was a friendship[ ] . . . [is] a severe 
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factors, a court must "consider[ ] the structure and theory 
of both relevant individual guidelines and the Guidelines 
taken as a whole, [and] decide whether [the factors are] 
sufficient to take the case out of the Guideline's heartland," 
before departing pursuant to S 5K2.0. Koon, 518 U.S. at 95- 
96 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also 
United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 244 (3d Cir. 
1998) (restating the Koon analysis of unmentioned factors). 
 
Considering the "structure and theory" of the fraud 
guideline and the Guidelines as a whole, as Koon instructs, 
we find that the district court acted within its discretion in 
concluding that this combination of five unmentioned 
factors was sufficient to take Iannone's case out of the 
Guidelines' heartland. 518 U.S. at 96. The Commentary to 
the fraud guideline expressly provides for upward 
departures based on factors not listed in the guideline text. 
In order to remedy the fraud guideline's predominant focus 
on the monetary amount of the victims' loss, the 
Commentary states that upward departures may be 
warranted "[i]n cases in which the loss . . . does not fully 
capture the harmfulness and seriousness of the conduct." 
U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, comment. (n.10) (Nov. 1997). By 
departing upwards, the district court demonstrated its 
belief that the harmfulness and seriousness of Iannone's 
conduct was not adequately captured by the offense level 
increases for the amounts of the victims' losses. In fact, the 
court believed that no existing guideline enhancement 
adequately captured the conduct upon which it based the 
S 5K2.0 departure. We do not disagree with the district 
court's conclusion. 
 
Furthermore, while no existing guideline enhancement 
covers Iannone's conduct, two areas of the Guidelines 
provide specific bases for upward departures based on 
conduct similar to his. Subsection (b)(3)(A) of the fraud 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
harm"), the court also specifically found that there was not sufficient 
evidence to support an upward departure under S 5K2.3. Thus, because 
the district court did not depart based on "extreme psychological harm," 
but rather, based on a combination of circumstances which included a 
lesser psychological harm component, we classify the factor as 
"unmentioned" by the Guidelines. 
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guideline provides for a two-level increase in offense level 
where the offense involved "a misrepresentation that the 
defendant was acting on behalf of a charitable, educational, 
religious or political organization, or a government agency." 
U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(3)(A) (Nov. 1997). The applicable 
Commentary indicates that the rationale for this 
enhancement is that "defendants who exploit victims' 
charitable impulses or trust in government create particular 
social harm." U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, comment. (backg'd P 4). 
Although the S 2F1.1(b)(3)(A) enhancement does not apply 
to Iannone's conduct, its rationale does: Iannone's 
misrepresentations that he was a Vietnam veteran, combat 
medal recipient, government agent, and widower who had 
lost his family to a drunk driver, created a particular social 
harm that the Guidelines do not explicitly take into account.13 
Iannone's misrepresentations about being a Vietnam 
veteran and recipient of several medals exploited his 
victims' trust in and respect for Vietnam war heroes. 
Iannone's claim to have been recommended for the 
Congressional Medal of Honor was particularly exploitive, 
as this is the nation's highest and most revered military 
award.14 His misrepresentation that he worked for a 
government agency also encouraged his victims' trust. 
Finally, his misrepresentation that his family had been 
killed by a drunk driver exploited his victims' charitable 
impulses. Another area of the Guidelines that provides for 
an upward departure based on conduct similar to Iannone's 
is S 5K2.3. It specifically encourages courts to depart 
upwards if the defendant's conduct caused his victim 
extreme psychological injury. While the district court did 
not find that Iannone's victims had suffered extreme 
psychological injury, it did find that they had suffered a 
psychological injury more severe than that occurring in a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Though Iannone falsely claimed to be a government agent, this 
conduct did not qualify for a S 2F1.1(b)(3)(A) enhancement because he 
never claimed to be selling HNR or WDH investment opportunities on 
behalf of a government agency. 
 
14. Of the more than two million military personnel who served in 
Vietnam during the period 1964-1973, only 239 have been awarded the 
Congressional Medal of Honor. See The World Almanac and Book of Facts 
1998 158 (Robert Famighetti et al. eds., 1997). 
 
                                23 
  
typical fraud case and included this as a reason for a 
departure. These two analogies to conduct similar to 
Iannone's further support the district court's finding that a 
S 5K2.0 departure was appropriate. 
 
These analogies also demonstrate that the extent of the 
district court's departure -- two offense levels-- was 
reasonable. A district court in determining the extent of a 
departure should generally do so by analogizing to existing 
Guidelines provisions. See United States v. Kikumura, 918 
F.2d 1084, 1110-14 (3d Cir. 1990) (establishing this Court's 
standard for determining the proper extent of departure); 
Baird, 109 F.3d at 872 (applying Kikumura). See also United 
States v. Adelman, 168 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(analogizing to another Guidelines provision was an 
appropriate method for determining the extent of an 
upward departure). We review this determination 
deferentially. See Baird, 109 F.3d at 872. In this case, the 
district court did not expressly undertake the analogic 
reasoning that this court generally requires in determining 
the extent of an upward departure. However, by couching 
the departure as a two-level increase in the offense level, 
the district court implicitly did so. As noted above, there is 
a reasonable analogy in the Guidelines that justifies the 
extent of the court's departure: subsection (b)(3)(A) of the 
fraud guideline, which provides for a two-level increase in 
offense level. See S 2F1.1(b)(3)(A) (Nov. 1997). 
 
We briefly address Iannone's arguments in support of his 
challenge to the district court's S 5K2.0 departure. Iannone 
argues that the base offense level for fraud adequately took 
into account all of his relevant misconduct; that is, both his 
misrepresentations and the psychological damage to his 
victims. As to his misrepresentations, Iannone argues in 
his brief that the Guidelines "obviously contemplated 
fraudulent misrepresentations . . . as integral to the 
commission of a fraud" and thus they did not warrant an 
upward departure under S 5K2.0. Iannone claims that his 
misrepresentations were either incidental to his fraud or 
mere acts of concealment and therefore were not 
sufficiently offensive or unique to "suggest a factor `present 
in a degree which the Commission did not consider'. . . . 
[or] `substantially in excess of that which is ordinarily 
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involved in the offense of conviction.' " (Quoting United 
States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 783, 783 (3d Cir. 1988).) He argues 
that faking his death, falsely claiming to work for a federal 
"alphabet agency," and falsely stating that his family had 
been killed by a drunk driver were merely creative 
concealment stories invented only to avoid detection, and 
therefore that those misrepresentations do not warrant 
an upward departure. He also claims that his 
misrepresentations of himself as a Vietnam veteran and 
recipient of combat medals were not part of his fraud. 
Rather, these misrepresentations had begun years before 
the frauds and were a result of "his own psychological 
needs[.]" Finally, the brief asserts that these were "garden 
variety" fraudulent misrepresentations and were already 
used as the basis for the vulnerable victim departure. 
 
Iannone correctly points out that fraudulent 
misrepresentations were an inherent part of his offense and 
therefore, to a certain degree, are included in the base 
offense level for fraud. However, the district court found 
that Iannone's misrepresentations went beyond the usual 
"heartland" and as such were not adequately taken into 
account by the Guidelines. Iannone falsely stated to his 
Colorado victims that he had lost his family to a drunk 
driver, and the court found that this was done in order to 
exploit his victims' charitable impulses and encourage their 
investment. Similarly, the court found that the false 
persona that Iannone created as a decorated Vietnam 
veteran and government agent was adopted in order to take 
advantage of his victims. The court found Iannone's 
repeated misrepresentations that he had received combat 
medals particularly offensive, noting that misrepresentation 
of the ownership of a combat medal may violate federal law.15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. 18 U.S.C. S 704(a) provides that "[w]hoever knowingly wears . . . any 
decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the armed forces of the 
United States, or any of the service medals or badges awarded to the 
members of such forces, or the ribbon, button, or rosette of any such 
badge, decoration or medal, or any colorable imitation thereof, except 
when authorized under regulations made pursuant to law, shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both." 
Section 704(b) provides additional punishment if the decoration or medal 
involved in the offense is the Congressional Medal of Honor. 
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The court also cited Iannone's elaborately staged death at 
the Pittsburgh airport, the grief this conduct caused his 
family, and its cost to his creditors. In sum, the court 
found some of Iannone's misrepresentations to have been 
particularly egregious and calculated, clearly disagreeing 
with his contention that they were mere acts of 
concealment or incidental to his fraud. More importantly, 
the court found that those misrepresentations were 
aggravating factors not adequately reflected by any existing 
guideline provision.16 We find that the district court acted 
within its discretion in reaching this conclusion. 
 
With respect to the psychological damage to his victims, 
Iannone claims that the district court abused its discretion 
by including this as a reason for departure, for two reasons: 
(1) the psychological harm he caused his victims had 
already been included in the base offense level for fraud; 
and (2) the record demonstrates that the four victims who 
testified at the sentencing hearing are mentally and 
physically healthy. The Guidelines contradict Iannone's 
claim that the psychological harm he caused his victims 
already has been included in the base offense level for 
fraud. The Commentary to the fraud guideline specifically 
provides that an upward departure may be appropriate 
where "the offense caused reasonably foreseeable . . . 
psychological harm or severe emotional trauma."S 2F1.1, 
comment. (n.10(c)) (Nov. 1997). While Iannone correctly 
points out that the record demonstrates that the four 
victims who testified are mentally and physically healthy, 
the record also supports the district court's conclusion that 
the psychological damage suffered by them exceeded that of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. The court noted that it is not double-counting to subject Iannone to 
the vulnerable victim enhancement due to O'Dowd's vulnerability as a 
Vietnam veteran and also include Iannone's masquerade as a Vietnam 
veteran as one of the reasons for the S 5K2.0 departure. We agree with 
the district court's conclusion. The enhancements are designed to 
punish different conduct. The vulnerable victim enhancement, as its 
name indicates, focuses on the nature of the victim. In contrast, a 
S 5K2.0 upward departure based in part on Iannone's Vietnam veteran 
masquerade is based on the rationale that the masquerade itself -- 
regardless of the nature of the victim -- is an"unmentioned" aggravating 
factor. 
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the typical fraud case. Most of Iannone's victims were 
Iannone's friends and/or neighbors. The district court 
found this circumstance not typical of a fraud case, noting 
the significant difference between being defrauded by 
someone you do not know and being defrauded by someone 
you thought was a friend. The court found that the loss of 
friendship that accompanied Iannone's fraud inflicted 
severe harm on his victims. The testimony of Iannone's 
victims at the sentencing hearing supports the district 
court's finding. Janice Stringert-Streich, for example, 
testified that she felt an extremely deep sense of loss and 
betrayal as a result of Iannone's fraud, and that the fraud 
destroyed her family. As we stated in United States v. 
Astorri, "[i]f there is any place in sentencing guidelines 
analysis where a fact-finder is to be given considerable 
deference, it is here where the district court is called upon 
to assess the psychological impact upon victims." 923 F.2d 
1052, 1058 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
In sum, we find that the court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that this combination of 
misrepresentations and psychological harm to the victims 
was sufficiently unusual to take Iannone's case out of the 
heartland of the Guidelines and, as a means of departure, 
to justify a two-level increase in his offense level. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
We conclude that the district court appropriately 
enhanced Iannone's offense level pursuant to SS 3A1.1, 
3B1.3, and 5K2.0 of the Sentencing Guidelines, and affirm 
the sentencing judgment. 
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BECKER, Chief Judge, concurring: 
 
I join the majority opinion, as I am constrained to agree 
that Iannone's abuse of trust enhancement is justified given 
our decisions in United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171 (3d 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 
1996); and United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187 (3d Cir. 
1994). I write separately to express my concern that the 
current drafting of the abuse of a position of trust guideline 
is flawed insofar as it has engendered convoluted caselaw 
in which the concept of a "position of trust" has expanded 
far beyond the general understanding of that term, making 
an abuse of trust enhancement a virtual concomitant of a 
fraud conviction. I therefore urge the Commission to rework 
the guideline so as to confine "abuse of a position of trust," 
in fraud cases, to situations more closely approximating 
traditional trust relationships.1 If it then appears that fraud 
is not being sufficiently punished, the appropriate remedy 
would be for the Commission to increase the underlying 
offense levels, rather than to dilute the concept of"position 
of trust." 
 
I. 
 
Fraud inherently involves some exploitation of trust. See 
United States v. Koehn, 74 F.3d 199, 201 (10th Cir. 1996) 
("In every successful fraud the defendant will have created 
confidence and trust in the victim . . . ."); United States v. 
Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560, 1567 (11th Cir. 1995) ("[T]here is a 
component of misplaced trust inherent in the concept of 
fraud . . . ."); United States v. Hathcoat , 30 F.3d 913, 915 
(7th Cir. 1994) ("By its definition, embezzlement requires a 
finding of a breach of trust."). While it is possible in theory 
to exclude some frauds from "abuse of trust" as defined in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. "[F]rom its earliest days, the Commission has urged the federal 
judiciary to make suggestions for Guideline revision, viewing them as a 
means of implementing the ongoing monitoring process." United States v. 
Rudolph, 137 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1998) (Becker, J., concurring); see 
also U.S.S.G. ch. 1 pt. A, at 4(b) (stating that the Commission will 
analyze judicial decisions to determine how to refine the Guidelines); 
United States v. Woods, 24 F.3d 514, 518 n.4 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing 
same). 
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Guideline 3B1.3, it seems that our jurisprudence does not 
do so in practice with any degree of consistency. The 
contention that "the sentencing enhancement is not 
intended to apply in every case of fraud," Koehn, 74 F.3d at 
201, is easier to promise than to enforce. 
 
In Pardo, we identified three elements to consider in 
determining whether a position constitutes a position of 
trust: 
 
       (1) whether the position allows the defendant to 
       commit a difficult-to-detect wrong; (2) the degree of 
       authority which the position vests in defendant vis-a- 
       vis the object of the wrongful act; and (3) whether there 
       has been reliance on the integrity of the person 
       occupying the position. 
 
Pardo, 25 F.3d at 1192. Pardo stated that "[T]hese factors 
should be considered in light of the guiding rationale of the 
section--to punish `insiders' who abuse their positions 
rather than those who take advantage of an available 
opportunity." Id. The difficulty is that the literal application 
of the three-part test in fraud cases undermines Pardo's 
limitation to "insiders." Where a defendant orchestrates a 
fraud, particularly a fraud of the kind prosecuted in federal 
court, he will almost always be a sufficient "insider" under 
the Pardo test, even if he is at the same time taking 
advantage of the opportunity that his acts made available. 
 
A fraudulent scheme ordinarily contains all three Pardo 
elements: difficulty of detection, authority, and reliance. 
First, people who commit fraud do not do it overtly; they 
conceal it. Efforts to make the fraud look legitimate are a 
necessary part of fraud. Even in a simple scam--e.g., a 
door-to-door solicitation for a fictitious charity--it is 
difficult to verify a claim of charitable purpose. Fraud is 
therefore by its nature difficult to detect. Second, even the 
average fraud vests a high degree of authority in a 
defendant vis-a-vis the object of his wrongful act. Fraud 
consists of getting a victim to give to a criminal authority 
over items of value, however fleeting or illegitimate. See, 
e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 413 (3d Cir. 
1996) (defendant had the requisite degree of authority 
because he was authorized to withdraw victims' funds from 
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his company). And finally, it is difficult to imagine a fraud 
in which a victim does not rely on the integrity of the 
defendant; again, that is the very point of fraud. See 
Agathos v. Starlite Motel, 60 F.3d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(explaining that the elements of fraud are knowing 
misrepresentation, intent to induce reliance, and reliance); 
cf. United States v. Pelkey, 29 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(discussing the abuse of trust enhancement and noting that 
"[s]ome degree of consequential trust and reliance by the 
victim is to be expected in the majority of fraud cases 
involving false pretenses"). 
 
Because fraud normally includes all three factors, our 
description of abuse of trust works equally well as a 
description of fraud: "[I]f one party is able to take criminal 
advantage of the relationship without fear of ready or quick 
notice by the second party, the second party has clearly 
placed a level of trust in the first." United States v. 
Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989, 993 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting 
United States v. Hill, 915 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990)). In 
United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1998), the 
defendant ran a Ponzi scheme in the guise of a charity, 
defrauding many victims out of substantial sums. We found 
that: 
 
       Bennett's authority allowed him to disseminate 
       falsehoods about trust agreements and anonymous 
       benefactors, misrepresent that he received no 
       compensation for his charitable efforts, create a phony 
       board of directors made up of prominent individuals, 
       deceive investors that funds deposited with New Era 
       organizations were held in escrow or quasi-escrow 
       accounts, and provide false information to the I.R.S. 
       and investors. 
 
        In all of these undertakings, it was Bennett's position 
       of trust that cloaked him with the requisite authority to 
       deceive. . . . 
 
        Furthermore, it is clear the victims relied on 
       Bennett's integrity when making donations. They 
       believed, based on his representations, that their 
       money would be held in low-risk accounts to be 
       matched by anonymous donors and ultimately used for 
       charitable purposes. 
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Id. at 195-96. As soon as the abuse of trust has been 
described, so has the fraud. 
 
Likewise, describing fraud, or its "cousin," theft by deceit, 
describes an abuse of trust because fraud is the culpable 
exploitation of trust: 
 
       By viewing as especially culpable persons who "abuse" 
       their positions of trust, the guideline also recognizes 
       the time-honored legal concept that theft by deceit is to 
       be dealt with more harshly than simple theft. Whereas 
       ordinary theft is by and large an impersonal act, theft 
       by deceit, like its cousin fraud, is entirely personal. 
       Where an individual makes himself particularly 
       vulnerable by entrusting another with substantial 
       authority and discretion to act on his behalf and then 
       relies upon and defers to that person, a decision to 
       take advantage of that trust and vulnerability is 
       particularly abhorrent, as it undermines faith in one's 
       fellow man in a way that the ordinary pick-pocket 
       simply cannot. 
 
United States v. Ragland, 72 F.3d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 
II. 
 
The preceding discussion demonstrates that our tripartite 
test is better at detecting abuses of trust--including frauds 
--than it is in defining a true "position" of trust. Thus, 
garden-variety fraud as well as exotic schemes will 
ordinarily qualify for the enhancement, even though the 
Sentencing Guidelines were not supposed to work this way. 
 
True, an occasional exceptional case may not qualify for 
the enhancement. Pardo is one of the increasingly rare 
cases to reject an abuse of trust enhancement for fraud. In 
that case, we found the enhancement unjustified where 
formal checks against bank fraud were in place, but the 
defendant's friend, a bank manager, bypassed them 
(without apparent criminal intent) to help her friend. We 
found that there was no position of trust because the 
safeguards were designed so that the bank would not need 
to rely on borrowers' credibility; the crime should not have 
been difficult to detect. 
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Judge Harris's opinion distinguishes Iannone's situation 
from that in Pardo because the difficult-to-detect element 
does not require due diligence by the victim: 
 
       Iannone's victims did not have to be experts in the oil 
       and gas industry or conduct an extensive investigation 
       into Iannone's business for the S 3B1.3 enhancement 
       to be applicable. In fact, one rationale for a S 3B1.3 
       enhancement is that, where the defendant occupies a 
       position of trust, his victims are less likely to discover 
       his fraud because they will not investigate the matter 
       as thoroughly as they would in an arm's-length 
       transaction. The focus of the first Pardo prong is on the 
       defendant, not his victims, and requires the court to 
       determine whether the position the defendant occupied 
       allowed him to commit a difficult-to-detect crime. 
 
Slip Op. at 16. 
 
While I agree that Pardo is distinguishable, I disagree 
that we can "focus" on the defendant to the exclusion of 
victims. In Pardo, for example, if there had been no formal 
safeguards against bank fraud, and the bank had relied on 
managers' assessments of clients' trustworthiness, then the 
defendant's fraud would have been difficult to detect. Cf. 
United States v. Sherman, 160 F.3d 967, 969-70 (3d Cir. 
1998) (insurance fraud by a doctor abused a position of 
trust because the victim-insurer used an honor system). 
But a decision to ignore the victims' level of care does not 
obviate the need to look at the victims to see whether, 
under the circumstances, the defendant occupied a position 
of trust with respect to them. 
 
Pardo is almost unique because the defendant used 
informal, personal ties to subvert standard, formalized 
safeguards. In this case, by contrast, Iannone chose a 
method whereby fraud was inherently difficult to detect-- 
his own representations about ownership of land, oil leases, 
and the oil and gas industry. The more informal the 
encounter between the defendant and his victims, the more 
difficult it will be for victims to detect potential fraud; the 
informality of the defendant's "position" leads to the 
application of the enhancement even though it is far from 
a traditional trust relationship. This result follows from our 
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decisions, which have yoked the existence of a position of 
trust to the difficulty of detection under the circumstances 
of the crime: 
 
       [O]ne has been placed in a position of trust when, by 
       virtue of the authority conferred by the employer and 
       the lack of controls imposed on that authority, he is 
       able to commit an offense that is not readily 
       discoverable. In such cases, the employer, by choice or 
       necessity, is relying primarily on the integrity of the 
       employee to safeguard against the loss occasioned by 
       the offense. 
 
United States v. Craddock, 993 F.2d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 
1993) (emphasis added). The exception carved out by Pardo 
is hardly an exception at all; the game is not worth the 
candle. 
 
I believe that this difficulty has arisen because our 
jurisprudence has extracted elements that characterize 
traditional trust relationships and generalized from them to 
define "positions of trust." While this case provides an 
example of a relationship that has the requisite elements 
and still seems to me to go far beyond the usual meaning 
of "position of trust," there are also examples of positions of 
trust without the three distilled elements. In United States 
v. Claymore, 978 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1992), a police officer 
raped a 13-year-old girl and fathered her child. This crime 
may have been difficult to prevent, given the authority 
delegated to police officers, but it was not difficult to detect 
--particularly insofar as we look at the position of trust 
from the victim's perspective, see, e.g., United States v. 
Castagnet, 936 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1991). Nevertheless, I 
have no doubt that the abuse of trust enhancement was 
justified in Claymore. See also United States v. Zamarripa, 
905 F.2d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1990) (abuse of trust 
enhancement applicable where babysitter sexually abused 
child). 
 
Claymore is an example in which the Pardo test would be 
underinclusive, though the greater danger is that our test 
so closely parallels the elements of fraud that it is 
overinclusive. Both the under- and overinclusiveness follow 
from the fact that the elements of the Pardo test are all 
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basically about deceit, which is involved in most (but not 
all) abuses of a fiduciary position of trust and is also 
involved in many other crimes. Deceit occurs in many 
forms, in relationships both formal and informal, casual 
and longstanding. Ultimately, then, the use of the tripartite 
test dilutes the concept of a "position" of trust, reducing 
our inquiry in practical terms to whether there was an 
"abuse of trust." 
 
III. 
 
Once we have expanded "abuse of trust" to cover 
situations in which there is only a misrepresentation of 
legitimacy that cannot be easily verified, I cannot see a 
limiting principle. As far as I can discern, the only type of 
fraud that might not justify the abuse of trust enhancement 
is a simple "pigeon drop" scam--and that only if we choose 
to impose some minimal requirement that victims take 
sensible precautions against fraud.2 Yet federal fraud cases 
rarely, if ever, involve defendants who commit basic frauds 
like the pigeon drop. Indeed, the single federal pigeon drop 
prosecution in the past fifteen years I have found in the 
reported federal cases involved a feigned position of trust-- 
a phony "investment adviser"--not unlike Iannone's in this 
case. See United States v. Jones, 648 F. Supp. 225 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. 
United States v. Blackmon, 839 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1988).3 
 
I therefore believe that the Sentencing Commission 
should rethink the relationship between the abuse of trust 
enhancement and fraud crimes.4 In such cases, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A "pigeon drop" is a scheme in which the criminals convince a victim 
that they have, together, stumbled upon lost riches. They "agree" to split 
the windfall amongst themselves, but the criminals convince the victim 
that unspecified legal or tax consequences prevent a simple split. The 
perpetrators inveigle the victim into giving up her own money to show 
her good faith and then disappear. 
 
3. The only other federal "pigeon drop" cases I have uncovered predate 
the Guidelines by an even longer period. See United States v. Ostertag, 
619 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1980); Charron v. United States, 412 F.2d 657 
(9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Edwards, 394 F. Supp. 1288 (E.D. Mo. 
1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 913 (8th Cir. 1975). 
4. Although my discussion suggests that this court has "run too far with 
the ball" in this area, we are not alone. See, e.g., United States v. 
Becraft, 
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enhancement should either be limited to fiduciary or quasi- 
fiduciary relationships, or the Commission should recognize 
that, as expanded by the cases, abuse of trust is part of the 
definition of fraud and therefore should not be applied to 
fraud crimes. See U.S.S.G. S 3B1.3 ("This adjustment may 
not be employed if an abuse of trust or skill is included in 
the base offense level or specific offense characteristic."). 
 
Alternatively, I would urge my colleagues to revisit the 
standard for applying the enhancement to fraud cases. The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has an instructive 
approach that we might consider. Its standard bars the 
enhancement in fraud cases where the defendant is neither 
a trusted employee of the victim nor in any fiduciary or 
quasi-fiduciary relationship with the victim: 
 
       Section 3B1.1 precludes an enhancement where the 
       abuse of trust is included in the specific offense 
       characteristic. Where fraud occurs in arm's-length 
       transactions not involving fiduciary-like relationships, 
       the "trust" that is "abused" is simply the reliance of the 
       victim on the misleading statements or conduct of the 
       defendant. The trust in short is a specific offense 
       characteristic of fraud, and a Section 3B1.3 
       enhancement is inappropriate. In the instant matter, 
       the lenders' trust in Jolly was simply their reliance on 
       his representations about Microtech's ongoing business 
       and the appearance created by the repayments. Such 
       reliance is the hope of every defendant who engages in 
       fraud. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        . . . Jolly held himself out as the president of a 
       company seeking capital, not as an investment advisor. 
 
United States v. Jolly, 102 F.3d 46, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1996). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
117 F.3d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding an abuse of a position of trust 
where the defendant, an office manager, was given"carte blanche" by the 
negligence of her immediate supervisor, permitting her to perpetrate an 
otherwise blatant fraud). The problem lies in the drafting of the 
Guidelines and Application Notes. 
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Under this approach, Iannone's fraud would have been 
an arm's-length investment transaction, despite his 
personal relationship with the victims. Friendship should 
not convert a non-fiduciary relationship into afiduciary 
one. See Koehn, 74 F.3d at 201 (distinguishing "arms- 
length commercial relationships where trust is created by 
the defendant's personality or the victim's credulity" from 
"relationships in which the victim's trust is based on 
defendant's position in the transaction"); United States v. 
Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560, 1567 (11th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the 
enhancement where the defendant befriended his victims 
and touted himself as a gifted investor, but did not hold 
himself out as an investment broker; holding that 
"[f]raudulently inducing trust in an investor is not the same 
as abusing a bona fide relationship of trust with that 
investor"). 
 
If the average fraud demands a higher sentence because 
of the harm inflicted upon the social fabric of trust, then 
the base offense level of fraud should be increased, rather 
than forcing courts in each case to identify the ways in 
which each fraud was slightly easier to commit or more 
difficult to detect than the average fraud. See United States 
v. Gordon, 61 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 1995) (explaining that 
the enhancement was designed to punish defendants who 
are "more culpable" than others in similar positions who 
engage in criminal acts). The abuse of trust enhancement 
as applied to fraud bears some resemblance to the children 
of Garrison Keillor's Lake Wobegon, all of whom are above 
average. This has unnecessarily complicated the law, 
stretching the conventional meaning of a position of trust to 
its breaking point. And it has created a regime that may 
well be under- as well as over-inclusive by substituting a 
showing that the defendant deceived victims for a 
requirement of a true fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary "position 
of trust." Thus the better approach is for the Sentencing 
Commission to revisit the area, and bring the notion of 
abuse of a position of trust back to (or at least close to) its 
generally understood meaning. 
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